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I . INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
The Industrial Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP)
is undergoing changes recommended by the IMIP Guide
Committee and the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
White Paper. This research will examine Government Return
on Investment (GROI) and its ability to measure utility
gained by Government investment. This research will also
assess IMIP's ability to incentivize the contractor.
Finally, the expected value of the qualitative benefits




1. As the Defense acquisition environment changes, can
IMIP effectively incentivize Defense contractors to make
capital investments to improve their operations and benefit
the military?
Subsidiary Research Questions:
1. What are IMIP's goals and objectives?
2. What are the Government's and DoD ' s goals and
objectives with respect to Defense procurement?
3. Are all benefits, including those that are difficult
to quantify, assessed according to their military value
when measuring GROI?
4. Are IMIP successes rated on these benefits?
5. Can IMIP reduce the decline of manufacturing
capability in the Defense industrial base?
6. What IMIP changes can further its benefits to the
Defense industrial base and the Government?
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to justify the
qualitative GROI factors which will maximize the utility
derived by the Government. IMIP has already proven itself
effective in reducing weapon systems costs and contributing
to maintaining the United States' Defense industrial base.
[Ref. 17] The purpose of this thesis is to determine
whether the newly revised IMIP can effectively meet its
objectives and contribute to maintaining the industrial base
despite the anticipated changes in both future acquisition
processes and the new world environment. Effectiveness will
be based on its accessibility to Defense contractors,
funding, program awareness, as well as acceptability.
Acceptability is the extent to which contractors would use
IMIP for capitalization if it was readily available.
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
This study was specifically limited to incentives for
the Government and contractors, and how these incentives
should be weighed to fully measure the utility derived by an
IMIP. It drew on the expertise of the DoD Components IMIP
guide meeting attendees, as well as written documentation
addressing IMIP and the Defense industrial base. The select
group of personnel interviewed provided assistance and
information on future IMIP goals and objectives. The
attendants of this meeting included a mix of military and
industry IMIP experts.
GROI criteria and measures of program effectiveness were
analyzed as to their ability to meet IMIP objectives.
Justification for considering alternate criteria will be
presented.
E . METHODOLOGY
This study consisted of two phases. The first phase was
to combine extensive literature review with personal
interviews from appropriate DOD and private sector personnel
attending the IMIP guide meeting in April 1992.
The second phase analyzed this information to determine
whether IMIP is being used as efficiently as possible. The
needs of Government and Defense will be presented, along
with IMIP's role and mission in meeting
these needs. The results of the thesis include
recommendations to make IMIP more acceptable to both
Government and Defense contractors.
F. ORGANIZATION
The thesis is organized into the following chapters:
II. BACKGROUND: Discusses the IMIP process, and how
it is being used today.
III. THE NEEDS OF DEFENSE: Examines the needs of the
Government and the military in relation to
procurement and the Defense industrial base.
IV. CONVERSION AND IMIP: Analyzes the factors that
should be used in determining facilities
modernization.
V. THE NEEDS OF THE CONTRACTOR: Reviews the
contractors needs and how IMIP can
effectively supply them incentives.
VII. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS: Provides a conclusion
to the research, recommendations to improve the




The Department of Defense established the IMIP in 1982.
The purpose of the program is to reduce weapon systems
acquisition costs and encourage Defense contractors to plan
to modernize their operations by implementing new equipment,
processes, or management techniques. [Ref. 1]
IMIP incentivizes the contractor to make capital
investments and productivity improvement efforts beyond
that required to meet contractual requirements. [Ref. 2:
p. 5]
IMIP was developed to encourage contractor financed
investments to refine production efficiency, reduce cost,
improve quality and increase reliability. It is a joint
venture between Government and industry to reduce
acquisition costs, accelerate the development of modern
equipment and management techniques, and broaden the
industrial base. The Nation's economic condition,
international competition, rising acquisition costs and the
potential for technological improvements made it of
paramount importance to improve acquisition efficiency in
the 1980s and 1990s. [Ref. 2]
The primary purpose of IMIP shall be to motivate Defense
contractors to make investments in modernization
projects that are beneficial to their company and to the
Government. Modernization of the Defense industrial base
will result in the following:
a. More cost effective or flexible production
capability for quality DoD weapon systems,
equipment software, and material.
b. Accelerated implementation of DoD-developed
manufacturing technologies minimizing the
impact of technology obsolescence.
c. Reduced operation and support costs
d. Improved responsiveness to emergency production
needs. [Ref. 7:p. 1]
The primary incentive for both the Government and the
contractor is the savings throughout the project life cycle
resulting from the modernization effort. The savings is
shared by both the Government and the contractor. In recent
years, the military has started to integrate Total Quality
Management (TQM) into its acquisition process. Even though
IMIP existed before the military implemented TQM, it shares
many TQM goals. IMIP and TQM can potentially assist both
the contractor and Government in achieving their objectives.
They focus on team work, continuous improvement and a
quality product. The following represents background
information on IMIP, its history, objectives, and the degree
to which it is being used. Implementing IMIP into an
existing acquisition, or writing a stand alone contract, is
a partnership and cooperative effort between the Government
and the contractor. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
In the last decade, IMIPs have been implemented by over
200 contractors in 36 states. According to an AIA White
Paper, since IMIP's inception, for a $2 billion contractor
investment, over $630 million of DoD savings was documented.
[Ref. 17]
B. THE IMIP PROCESS
The following discussion is a summary of a process
description taken from the new IMIP guide draft. An IMIP
can begin as part of a weapon system acquisition or as a
stand alone contract. During the opening stages of an IMIP
program, Government and industry representatives explore
program application and discuss potential investments and
the resulting benefits. Eventually, a formal business
agreement is established based on discussions about required
productivity improvements, necessary capital investments and
accrued benefits. Program managers establish goals and
objectives to ensure the IMIP's success. These objectives
are built on proper and thorough planning, development of
program milestones and scheduling, cost management and
periodic performance status reviews. [Ref. 14: p. 3] The
Government Program Manager (PM) draws on support from
contracts, program control, contract administration, pricing
and members of the technical community. By fully utilizing
the resources at his disposal, the PM can make an accurate
decision.
There are three funding sources for IMIP, Government
Industrial Base Program Element funds, acquisition funds,
and funds invested by industry. The decision regarding
sources is based on cash flow, availability of funds, risk,
Return on Investment (ROI) , need and technology transfer.
[Ref. 14: p. 4] It is important to note that IMIP can fund
facility analysis, design and integration of technologies.
It cannot directly fund actual capital acquisitions. [Ref.
14:p. 6]
If the technical or financial risk is high, the
company's investment can be protected through what is called
"Contractor Investment Protection." The Government assumes
part of the investment risk on an unfunded, contingent
liability basis. It is seldom used and requires special
approval and Congressional notification.
The benefits and rewards to be shared by the Government
and contractor are estimated by comparing the "as-is" and
"to-be" baselines established during program development.
The "as-is" analysis carefully reviews current operations
and determines costs, lead time and quality drivers. This is
a top-down analysis that is developed to the lowest level as
a means of determining performance measures, savings, and
benefits derived from the IMIP projects. [Ref. 14 :p. 26]
The "to-be" analysis provides alternatives for various
business sectors where process inefficiencies have been
found. Alternative processes and technological innovations
are examined for applicability to the particular business
sector.
The analysis process needs to support Cost-Benefit-
Analysis (CBA) and models for Discounted-Cash-Flow (DCF)
,
ROI and Government-Return-on Investment (GROI) models. [Ref.
14 :p. 26] The goals and objectives of Strategic
Modernization Plans (SMP) are developed for the contractor
to identify missing and needed technologies and evaluate new
technologies.
Both Government and the contractor select projects. The
contractor presents prospective projects to the Government
in priority order based on the analysis of factory
requirements. Candidate programs are further evaluated and
prioritized based on preliminary costs and payback. [Ref.
14:p. 29]
The technical approach is then refined, providing
greater detail and further analysis. The contractor also
develops a preliminary CBA. This includes both technical
and business aspects. Data generated through this process
are entered into a discounted-cash-f low model to determine
break-even period, pay back period, and net present value.
IMIP supports two types of modernization plans:
The Modernization Investment Projects (MIP) and the
Modernization Efficiency Projects (MEP) . MIPs involve
contractor investment in production equipment, facilities or
technology. In these projects, implementation costs and
other expenses not usually capitalized are eligible for IMIP
funding. MEPs enhance contractor productivity without
requiring significant capital investment. The resulting
contract must be comprehensive. Appropriate milestones and
Contract Data Requirements Lists (CDRLs) are defined for
each program phase. Clearly delineated deliverables are
established for the entire contract so that there is no
ambiguity concerning whether the intent of the IMIP contract
has been fulfilled or when it was completed. [Ref. 1]
Regardless of the type of IMIP contract, funding and
incentives can vary in size and type, depending on the
sponsoring Government agency's needs, and the company's
strategic modernization plans. [Ref. 12 :p. 1]
C. GOVERNMENT RETURN ON INVESTMENT (GROI)
IMIP is designed to assist the DoD in maximizing the
value of its investment. The primary tool for determining
whether the Government should provide funding for a given
project is the CBA. This analysis establishes the GROI,
also called the Return On Investment Initiative (ROII) . The
Government uses GROI to measure the utility derived by
investing in an IMIP. GROI is the combined total of all
benefits which accrue to the Government under an IMIP
project. It is used to establish total benefit. Under
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GROI, benefits are divided into three categories: 1. Instant
Contract Savings, 2. Future Cost Avoidance and 3.





























Government Return On Investment
Figure 1
Source: AIA White Paper [Ref. 14]
INSTANT CONTRACT SAVINGS Price reductions to instant
contracts as a result of IMIP improvements. They may
include all Government contracts in a given factory,
since investments for one program usually lead to price
reductions and additional benefits for other programs.
This is especially true at the subcontractor level.
Logistics programs, through spare parts buys, may also
realize these benefits. Significant instant savings and
price reductions may be realized from single-year
contracts with price options, or multi-year contracts.
[Ref. 49]
FUTURE COST AVOIDANCE Cost avoidances that do not
result in price reductions to open contracts, but
contribute to cost containment. With decreased weapon
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systems budgets, IMIP benefits in this area will help
program managers identify key industrial base
investments needed to keep their weapon systems
affordable. [Ref. 49]
QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS Benefits that are difficult to
measure using financial data, but no less important in
justifying an IMIP. When presented in a meaningful
manner, qualitative benefits can boost the prestige of a
program that otherwise may show prospects for only
marginal financial returns on investment. Qualitative
benefits, however, must reflect a real benefit, not just
mere description. [Ref. 14:p. 40]
Many programs that may help preserve the industrial base
may not be considered because they don't show "actual
benefit." Industrial base benefits are generally considered
collateral benefits, not primary benefits.
Numerous DoD officials, contractors, and Congressmen
have expressed overwhelming concern about effects of the
declining industrial base. It has become the focus for
numerous Congressional and DoD reports. IMIP has been
described as an effective program to help maintain the base.
Unfortunately, many important factors that preserve the
Defense industrial base are qualitative and difficult to
show financial benefit. For this reason, Government Program
Managers and their departments have focused on the instant
contract cost benefits.
Previous IMIP successes were measured primarily by cost
savings and cost avoidance. The AIA Industrial Modernization
Committee recommended a "reduced emphasis on cost savings
validation and greater emphasis on implementation." [Ref.
12
17: p. ii] IMIP is a program to help preserve the Defense
industrial base. Certainly cost savings and cost avoidance
are extremely important in the effort to keep contractors in
the Defense market. But other factors, particularly those
that are difficult to quantify, are of equal or greater
importance. Emphasizing cost encourages manufacturers to
seek lowest acceptable levels. Assuming that a contractor's
primary concern is long term profit, then the contractor
will probably put forth the minimal effort (cost) necessary
to meet the Government's specifications and standards,
unless there is an incentive for the contractor to do
otherwise. Performance based on minimal cost usually results
in minimal acceptable performance.
If IMIP is to be successful, many qualitative factors
must be given far greater consideration in the future
decision making process.
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Ill THE NEEDS OF DEFENSE
A. DEFINITION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The Defense industrial base is defined as:
The people, Government, and private firms, whose
skills and facilities develop, produce and maintain
the weapons and supporting equipment needed by our
armed forces in peacetime and in wartime. It is
becoming an indistinguishable part of our national
industrial base which, in turn, is part of an
increasingly global industrial base. [Ref. 50:p. 1]
B. EROSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The Defense industrial base is becoming increasingly
vulnerable to international Defense and industrial
influences, particularly military downsizing and the
internationalization of the world market place.
1. DOWNSIZING
The Defense industrial base is experiencing dramatic
downsizing. The fiscal 1993 request for weapon systems and
other hardware procurement is only $54.4 billion, down from
$96.8 billion in 1985. [Ref. 20:p. 1] Besides the decrease
in the size and number of contracts, other factors have
contributed to the escalating exodus of companies in the
Defense marketplace. These include: audit procedures,
procurement policy, Government attitudes, late payment,
Defense specifications and bidding methods. [Ref.
36: appendix b] Administrative difficulties continue to
drive vendors away. The number of companies doing military
14
business has already decreased from 120,000 in 1986, to less
than 28,000 today. [Ref. 8:p. 4] The end of the Cold War
...brings harsh realities for the workers, businesses
and communities that once supported our military
establishment in its heyday and that now must grapple
with the effects of the massive cuts in Defense
spending. [Ref. 50:p. 6]
Defense conversion is complicated because the world
remains a sometimes hostile and uncertain place. We
need both a vibrant Defense industrial base. . . and a
competitive civilian industrial base to generate
sufficient wealth to provide for an expanded economy
that will contribute to our economic security. [Ref.
50:p. 4]
Because of decreasing Defense spending, many Defense
contractors are being forced to make dramatic changes in
their organizational structure. This may further accelerate
the decline in the industrial base, worsening the country's
ability to mobilize and defend itself in a future
contingency.
2. INTERNATIONALIZATION
As the world market becomes more integrated, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to separate American
companies with large foreign interests from foreign
companies with large American interests. Many countries are
also interested in developing and producing the technologies
that DoD desperately wants to preserve. In recent years,
the U.S. Government has increased its utilization of foreign
sources. [Ref. 37] This puts an additional burden on DoD
to assist U.S. contractors.
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Dependency on foreign sources is risky. Some
countries are unstable, or may be allied with a potential
future enemy. Supplies from these countries could
conceivably be cut off during a crisis. Since World War II,
the Government has emphasized maintaining the Defense
industrial base with U.S. sources. Legislation, such as the
Buy American Act, limits DoD's purchases to American
products where possible, and restricts foreign suppliers.
In recent years, modifications to existing legislation, and
additional legislation have liberalized Government and
domestic procurement from international sources. Despite
the many significant economic gains that will result from
this new open market, some critical technologies may be lost
to foreign sources.
a. OPEN MARKET
To ease trade difficulties, many foreign firms
have invested directly into the United States, buying
minority/majority interests in American companies or
establishing their own qutlets. This strategy counters
protectionist agitation, places a broader range of products
into the U. S. market, improves eligibility on Government
purchases and secures their own supplier base.
Businesses from many countries are also becoming
increasingly receptive to collaboration. Joint ventures,
coproduction, technology transfer, training schemes or a
16
combination of these have become essential marketing tools
for many firms successfully competing in the U. S. market.
[Ref. 38] Companies have found this to be mutually
beneficial, especially on large Research and Development
(R&D) projects. This environment of cooperation and
collaboration can substantially increase the potential for
technology leaks. This makes it extremely difficult to
preserve domestic critical technology.
If a U.S. company with a critical technology or
process has international branches, or is conducting a joint
international venture, the foreign interests may have a
market for this technology. Transferring this technology to
the foreign interests would be illegal and unethical. But
corporate personnel and information can easily cross
international borders. It is becoming extremely difficult
to keep ideas or technology solely in the U.S. Once a
foreign producer emerges, it would be virtually impossible
to determine whether the technology was transferred, or
simultaneously developed.
b. FOREIGN INTEREST
Japanese companies are excellent examples of
companies that are becoming more common as DoD suppliers.
[Ref. 35] Japan will continue to enter markets that they
can successfully compete in, and will also be a leader in
17
research and development. Japanese government
organizations, programs, and incentives help contribute to
this success.
Japan is one of our most valued allies, but their
assessment of important technologies is similar to other
countries, including the United States. Increasingly
sophisticated weapons are appearing in arsenals throughout
the world and amongst countries that may ultimately be
future adversaries. [Ref. 20]
The Japanese R&D program is very successful. It
is expected to allow Japan to enter new technology markets.
The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) works closely with industry to identify promising
technologies, establish cooperative research programs and to
select a leading foreign company as a model. The private
sector and MITI guide Japanese industrial policy to satisfy
the needs of the economy. Even though MITI ' s role is
advisory, it has committed itself to high technology and the
resulting commercial success. Through MITI, Japan has
developed a technology strategy for the twenty first century
that calls for Japan to be a world leader in areas such as
robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and
aerospace. [Ref. 38:p. 5]
The technologies that Japan desires to develop
are similar to the ones the U. S. is ambitiously trying to
develop and preserve. The ability for U.S. industry to meet
18
military requirements is being challenged, particularly in
high technology items. This is forcing the military to buy
needed quality and technologically advanced parts from the
Japanese and other foreign sources.
Japan focuses on producing key technologies
better than its competitors. It does not focus as much on
the technology itself!! There is, and always has been, a
diversification of technology. Technology is developed at
one place. Eventually other organizations acquire it,
either through licensing agreements, industrial espionage,
or reverse engineering.
U.S. engineering schools seem to emphasize the
importance of design engineering. Because process technology
is not emphasized, the U.S. manufacturing workforce is not
at the same level as comparable international manufacturing
workforces. Engineering programs, should be supported,
especially in manufacturing and production processes. [Ref.
50]
When other countries decide to develop a
technology, in competition with the U.S., and supply
stimulus to their markets, it puts an additional burden on
the U.S. Preserving critical technologies necessitates
Government support in developing and manufacturing of these
products. This requires the Government to provide the
manufacturer with greater incentives. It would be very
expensive for the military to be completely self sufficient
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on domestic suppliers. The Government must decide which
Defense technologies are most important to maintain domestic
capability (e.g. are some allies more reliable, some
technologies available from several sources, etc.).
C. THE NEEDS OF GOVERNMENT
Because of the new world order, the Nation is facing new
opportunities and challenges that will determine our
continued role as a first class economic, not merely
military, world power. [Ref. 50:p. 1] The changing
environment has forced the Government to maintain a viable
Defense industry when spending is being dramatically cut.
The work force must also be redirected to compete
economically with other nations.
The House Armed Services Committee set up a Panel "to
identify steps that Congress might take to help ensure the
existence of a stable competitive base that is capable of
meeting U.S. national security needs." [Ref. 50:p. 2]
The Global Security Project of Georgetown University,
which conducted an independent review. . . stated that the
DoD is making major policy decisions without knowing
their long term consequences. In other words, the
administration's free market approach will not take care
of dislocated Defense worker or ensure industry
survival. [Ref. 50 :p. 3]
The Panel determined that policies and plans were needed
that enable
...the remaining Defense industrial base to continue to
invent and build affordable systems that meet our
military needs and to create new commercial
20
opportunities for the idled portion of today's Defense
complex." [Ref. 50:p. 4]
"Conversion" is a concept for transforming the Defense
industrial base. It means
...new opportunities for Defense companies, and workers
alike; using the Defense dollars saved, it means making
major capital investments in national infrastructure
programs such as the environment, energy or
transportation to name a few. It also means having the
skills available to respond to future military threats
should they emerge. [Ref. 50: p. 4]
IMIP could provide an effective means of coordinating
the conversion process within DoD. IMIP and the conversion
strategy have very similar objectives. IMIP focuses on
maximizing the benefit derived by DoD; conversion
concentrates on benefiting the country. The objectives for
preserving the Defense industrial base through conversion
are:
1. Developing quality management programs-Defense firms
and the Defense Department must foster a commitment of
increasing productivity and promoting a world class
industrial base.
2. Transferring skills-Successful Defense conversion
requires not only transferring skills and facilities
away from Defense, but being able to transfer them back
to Defense when necessary.
3. Promoting technical education-Educational programs in
engineering, especially in the areas of manufacturing
and production processes should be supported.
4. Encouraging new manufacturing techniques-The United
States must not only maintain its weapons superiority,
it must seek ways of increasing its national
competitiveness
.
5. Preserving elements of the Defense industrial base-
Unique Defense systems critical to national security
should be retained. As an example, heavy industries,
especially ships submarines, are of particular concern.
21
6. Changing acquisition policies-Regulatory barriers to
commercial/Defense integration should be eliminated,
thus maximizing the use of commercially available
components and production facilities. [Ref. 50: p. 5]
22
IV. CONVERSION AND IMIP
A. INTRODUCTION
By implementing a Government conversion strategy, a
constancy of purpose could be maintained throughout the DoD
and be reflected amongst all Defense programs. Secretary of
Defense Cheney, Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood, and
members of the House Armed Services Committee have
emphasized manufacturing in their concern for maintaining
the Defense Industrial Base. Conversion is a way that the
Government can ensure the existence of a stable Defense
industrial base.
The Defense market is different than the commercial
market. In most competitive markets, it would be
unreasonable to capitalize when current facilities are not
being used to their maximum potential. Similarly, DoD
contractors will not capitalize when they have access
capacity and demand is decreasing. However, this may not be
in the National interest. The DoD market place must
overcome many unusual factors such as: it is essentially a
monopsony (one large buyer with many sellers) , that is
highly regulated, requires state-of-the-art technology, and
is under intense public scrutiny. Also the cost of failure
of Defense to the country is significantly greater than that
of commercial markets.
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The rapid changes taking place in the Defense market
environment justify a conversion strategy. The DoD
concentrates its needs on emergency requirements which are
dependent upon the perceived threat. The Government's
conversion strategy focuses on meeting the DoD needs and
must be sensitive to preserving the national economic
infrastructure and labor markets. [Ref. 50:p. 4]
There are many factors of a conversion strategy that
could be applied through IMIP. The objectives of conversion
are directly related to the GROI factors used in developing
an IMIP. Figure 1 illustrates qualitative GROI factors as
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Conversion and IMIP Qualitative Factors
Figure 2
Source: Dr. Gates and Researcher [Ref. 8]
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B. PRESERVING ELEMENTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
Defense critical technologies are identified, but not
applied to the U.S. Defense industrial base. Defense
critical technologies are those that are determined to be
necessary to preserve the country's defense. Past
Government policy has reflected that certain skills and
abilities that apply specifically to the military must be
maintained solely by the U. S. and are considered vital to
national security.
The potential threat, the technology's ability to meet
that threat, the ability to apply the technology to other
divergent threat situations and the degree of immediacy and
necessity must be measured. Critical technologies are more
important to modernize than less critical technologies.
These factors can be broken down into critical
products/technologies and critical processes/production
methods.
1. CRITICAL PRODUCTS/TECHNOLOGIES
The risk of U. S. involvement in a full scale
conventional or nuclear war has supposedly declined since
the breakup of the Soviet Union. Still, threats exist and
the U.S. continues to focus heavily on research and
development, and preserving critical Defense technologies.
To maintain the world's strongest military, the United
States must maintain technological superiority.
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A key factor to the United States military's success
during recent conflicts has been superior advanced
technology weaponry. As proven in the Gulf war, the
importance of technological superiority over numerical
superiority was obvious. The United States was able to
completely control the war largely because of superior
weaponry.
There are many DoD programs that support and
encourage R&D and product improvement. Deputy Secretary of
Defense Atwood gave testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee on DoD's approach to meeting Defense needs given
decreasing spending. His plan consisted of investing
heavily in R&D. The plan also called for limited production
of new weapon systems. Manufacturing will be lean. Many
systems may only be produced through prototypes. Instead of
developing a whole new weapon system to meet threats,
existing weapon systems may be extensively modified. [Ref.
20:p. 22]
There are many (government programs designed to
preserve different areas of the industrial base. Examples
include: Value Engineering, Best Value, In-plant Quality
Evaluation (IQUE) , and Small and Disadvantaged Business
programs. These programs focus on specific aspects of the
Defense industrial base such as: R&D, developing new
technologies, product improvement and stimulating small
business/small disadvantaged businesses.
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2. CRITICAL PROCESSES/PRODUCTION METHODS
In the past, many Defense programs have heavily
emphasized product technology development, with considerably
less emphasis on the aspect of manufacturing. [Ref. 20:p.23]
Conrad Peter Schmidt, an economic policy analyst with the
private Defense Budget Project cautions,
...if you're protecting your technology base while
allowing your manufacturing base to decline, then you're
protecting only one of your pillars. [Ref. 20:p. 23]
IMIP is a program that is uniquely tooled to advance
manufacturing capability. IMIP allows the Government to
examine a Defense program throughout its life cycle and
analyze the contractor's ability to produce the item on
demand. Through IMIP, the company has an opportunity to
increase its profits and reduce the military's costs. It
supplies companies with opportunities to invest, with less
risk, so they can modernize in areas that would not have
otherwise been possible.
Preserving critical processes is most important to
meet military manufacturing needs. The new acquisition
process will require equal attention to both actual product
development and process development. Secretary of Defense
Cheney said:
We well understand that the process of developing a new
weapon system involves not only developing the
technology and engineering into a weapon, it also
involves developing the manufacturing process that would
allow you to produce it in significant numbers. [Ref.
52:p. 40]
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Defense manufacturing needs to be able to produce an
item when it is needed. A greater manufacturing focus,
particularly in the product design phase, would provide for
lower costs, designer quality and reliability and faster
marketing and utilization of newly developed products. We
have been guilty in this country, both in industry and
Government, of emphasizing "product" not "process"
technology. [Ref. 20:p. 39]
If a production process does not have a strong ROI,
the contractor will probably discontinue it and focus the
organization's energies on market areas supplying sufficient
ROI. Many Defense critical technology processes are solely
military based and have no commercial counterparts. Using
IMIP to preserve this type of technology to meet
mobilization requirements may require considerable
contractor and Government creativity.
The Defense industry is already undergoing
realignment. As current contracts close out and no
new business is offered, companies will restructure
to rid themselves of nonproductive assets. [Ref . 53]
Because the need to mobilize is uncertain, expected
ROI on maintaining mobilization capability is also
uncertain. If there is no mobilization, the contractor would
not recapture the investment. However, having the
capability to mobilize, if required, may have benefits to
the nation that exceed the company's costs. For certain
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critical processes, the Government may consider an
"insurance like" investment justifiable regardless of its
ROI.
3. PRODUCTION BREAKS/FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION
Maintaining Surge/Mobilization capability involves
the unknowns of restarting the production process after
initial production has stopped. The value of IMIP should
not be actual cost savings, but potential savings if the
need to mobilize arises. According to Deputy Secretary of
Defense Atwood:
...given the current inventories of high technology
weapons relative to the smaller force, there will
probably be a gap in production requirements for some
systems. [Ref. 52]
Restarting production on prototype acquisitions will
also have similar production breaks. Limiting production to
prototype models implies a time lapse between technology
development, and usable product manufacturing. When
production stops, there is a loss in an organization's
ability to restart the production process. [Ref. 23 :p. 34]
Maintaining the ability to restart production is essential
to maintaining the industrial base.
One possible future role for IMIP could be for
Defense critical technology processes that are used today,
but may be lost if DoD should decrease or stop purchasing
the item. Current platforms lacking sufficient inventory
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for repair and upkeep may require the DoD to reorder parts
from the contractor. It is unlikely that the contractor will
be able to supply these parts on demand if the production
line has been closed. Contractor facilities may have been
sold off, scrapped (because no alternate use could be found)
or retooled to meet another need.
There are a number of factors that effect the rate
of learning during a production break for manufactured
products. Production breaks may occur either as demand for
an existing system declines or when the contract calls for
producing only prototypes or limited numbers of weapon
systems. The IMIP negotiator needs to evaluate these
factors. If the weapon system cannot meet a threat because
it cannot be fielded in sufficient time, it is essentially
useless. The contractor must consider start up costs;
including production delays in designing the production
process.
a. DISCUSSION
Any interruption in the orderly and continuous
flow of work from one work station to another is accompanied
by an increase of labor hours and other costs when
production is resumed. These costs are directly related to
loss of improvement. Figure 3 shows the impact of a
production break on unit cost. "Productionl" represents the
average direct labor costs per unit of the original
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production process. The Z value represents the start up
cost. Z measures the cost of the manufacturing interruption
by comparing the cost of the last unit produced in the
original production run to the cost of the first unit
produced in the new production run. The magnitude of Z will
T = Original First Unit Cost
Z = Start Up Costs of Foliov-on Production Process
Z+Y = Total Average Cost Associated With the First Unit Cost
of the Foliov-on Production Process
Y = Total Average Cost Associated vith the Last Unit Produced
of the First Production Process
Production 1 = Level of Learning (slope) Associated vith the
Original Production Process
Production 2 = Level of Learning (slope) Associated vith the
Foliov-on Production Process
56789 10 2 3 4
QUANTITY PRODUCED
5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 3
Source: "What Production Breaks Cost" [Ref. 23]
31
lie somewhere between Y (lowest impact) and T (maximum
impact) . The rate of learning (slope) should be greater
than or equal to that of the original learning curve. This
section will focus on defining, valuing and controlling
start up costs and delays.
b. DEFINING
George Anderlohr defined five learning factors to
identify learning losses due to production breaks. [Ref.
23: p. 35] These factors have been modified and updated into
the following six key elements:
1. Personnel Learning This element includes the
actual physical loss of personnel during the break. By
reviewing personnel records, an auditor can establish this
learning loss. Learning loss will also take place amongst
personnel that remain in production. People lose their
physical dexterity and familiarity with the product. There
are losses of momentum, requiring reorientation to the
production process.
2. Supervisory Learning This element includes
the turnover of supervisory personnel as a result of regular
movement. Management will make a greater effort to retain a
higher caliber of supervisory personnel, so the physical
loss is generally less than with production personnel.
However, guidance by those remaining will still be reduced
as familiarity with the job decreases.
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3. Continuity of productivity This relates to
the physical positioning of the production line, the
relationship of one work station to another and the location
of lighting, bins, parts, and tools within the work station.
This also includes position adjustment to optimize the
individual workers needs. Another major factor is the work
in process buildup. Existing jobs are cleared so the line
can be devoted to a new job.
4. Methods This represents process descriptions
and written operating procedures that describe the original
manufacturing process. As long as detailed reports of the
original processes are maintained, method losses will be
minimal.
5. Special Tooling New and better tooling are
major contributors to learning. In relating loss in tooling
to learning, the major factors are wear, physical
misplacement, and breakage. An additional consideration may
be adjusting for increased capacity. A change over from
short run, or so called soft tooling, to long run hard
tooling, may also be necessary.
6. Extent to which operations were suspended
This element involves planning for follow-on production. If
the organization expects follow-on contracts, the effects of
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this element can be reduced substantially. This is the
particular area where IMIP can aid in reducing the overall
loss due to production breaks
c. VALUING
Weighing these elements requires the analyst to
look at their effects in the follow-on start-up phase as
well as their effect on the rate of learning (slope) in the
new production learning curve. The organization must collect
and monitor performance data and develop specific parameter
values for the results to be useful. The effect of each
element on the total loss of experience cost should be
estimated. This can be done by analyzing historical data
regarding changes associated with production breaks. The
analyst can use regression analysis to develop an equation
that best fits the set of data points.
The common parameter to determine the values of
these factors is time. [Ref. 27 :p. 40] Their values vary in
magnitude of influence proportionately to the time period of
interruption.
Figure 4 is a reproduction of Carlson's graph
"Performance Versus Elapsed Weeks for an Interrupted
Operation." [Ref. 27 :p. 43] It shows how learning relates to
time. The "Forget" part of the graph represents the key
area to be measured in estimating the loss of learning due
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to the break. It represents the forgetting rate (slope)
.






20% Period of the
Production Break
Standard Performance = Improvement Saturation
vhere the process is at maximum effiency
Total Knovledge Forgotten
A = vhere original production stops
B = vhere foliov-on production begins
8 12 16 20
MONTHS OF EXPERIENCE
Figure 4
Source: Article "How Much Does Forgetting Cost?" [Ref: 27]
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These factors may affect both the start up costs
of the new production and the slope of the learning curve.
This would give a completely different shape to "Learn2"
than that of the process before the break. A successful
negotiator should ensure that an organization balance the
costs of these effects with the costs of reducing their
impact.
d. CONTROLLING
By limiting the influence of these elements, the
contractor can keep costs closer to value Y (Figure 3) and
possibly improve the slope of the follow-on production
process. The possibility for follow-on orders should always
be anticipated. As a example, the Grumman corporation
received a follow-on order for the C-2A project. "The old
production line had been shut down for over seventeen
years." [Ref. 26:p. 51] This is probably a highly unusual
production break. Still, Grumman should have retained some
portion of their previous abilities, so that they would not
have to completely reduplicate their initial start-up costs.
In Figure 3, the "Z" value would be closer to "T"
(inflationary effects not included)
.
Before the break in production occurs, and as
early as possible in the life cycle, the Government should
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ensure that the organization's management is anticipating
restarting production after a break period. This involves
the following steps:
1. Training. Maintain an effective training
program that includes communicating corporate values and
objectives, education and skill development. Many skills
are interchangeable from one job to another. Establishing
greater line worker proficiency in these areas can decrease
the effects of the transition. Concentration should focus
on those functions that will not be transferred or used
during the break.
2. Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS) . FMS
should be implemented that facilitates transferring
capability between production processes. When mobilizing,
FMS can ease the transition of the manufacturing facilities
from the commercial to the Defense market. FMS involves
maintaining flexibility in equipment and the workforce.
3. Knowledge base. In general, people resist
change. Transferring from one job to another is easier for
those who are knowledgeable about the transition and work in
an environment that goes through periodic transitions.
Develop a "lessons learned" program, where everyone has a
chance to supply feedback on completed jobs. Feedback
ensures mistakes are not carried over into future jobs.
Establish a solid nucleus of knowledge. This can be
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effectively accomplished by using teams, making decisions
jointly with employees, employing craftsman, and maintaining
good communications and flexible working hours, and
constantly modernizing production technologies. These all
contribute to forming a solid knowledge base which can be
applied to various settings. The larger and more extensive
the knowledge base, the more it limits the loss of learning
during production breaks. [Ref. 25:p. 89]
4. Innovations and Upgrades. It is very doubtful
that the follow-on production process will be exactly as it
was before the break. Depending on the length of the break,
technical innovations or more efficient methods may be
introduced. Many procedures may be upgraded. The more
complicated the production process, the greater the
opportunity for technological improvement. It may not be in
the Government's best interest to purchase highly automated
equipment to prepare for follow-on production, if
anticipated innovations may make that technology obsolete
prior to the anticipated need.
It is also important that new technologies and
production methods be sought out and investigated before a
company restarts the production process.
5. Coordinating Resources. If follow-on jobs are
known, the break period can be utilized to find more cost
effective means of procurement and inventory control. The
38
break may give the contractor an opportunity to seek out
more cost effective suppliers or upgrade inventory
management techniques. Effectively controlling inventory
and coordinating a firm's resources can substantially reduce
production costs. Also, the volume of production may affect
economies of scale. Companies with larger production
volumes tend to produce more cheaply than their smaller
contemporaries
.
Anticipated production breaks are an ideal time
to modernize facilities. If the facilities are going to be
idle, or retooled to produce another product, improvements
can be made for the transition with minimal disruption on
the workforce. All of these factors have substantial
military benefit to help maintain a responsive industrial
base that can meet Defense needs when required.
Resolving potential problems in the negotiation
phase can avoid the large start up costs and time delays
attributed to follow-on orders. By requiring the contractor
to address start up costs, and develop a comprehensive SMP




As an example, the critical components of a tank;
the engines, transmissions, armor, fire control and assembly
were determined to be critical. But they are not critical
enough to offer special support. [Ref. 20:p. 60]
Commercial manufacturers exist for both gas and
turbine engines. With fire control systems, there is a
great deal of commonality between tanks, ships, aircraft,
etc. The more unique the process, the more difficult it is
to reconstitute the required production skill should
production be stopped. Armor manufacturing process is
considered "pretty unique." If a determination is made that
the Defense mission needs tanks with high quality armor,
then it may be identified as a critical technology. [Ref.
52: p. 60] If there is no need to buy the product, this
process is in jeopardy of being lost.
An IMIP could assist in maintaining this
technology without spending money to develop a tank. This
solution may involve finding an alternative use for the
armor manufacturing process that would allow easy transition
back to armor manufacturing should the need arise.
Obviously, the need for armor plate outside of
DoD is not significant. However there may be processes that
are similar enough for the contractor to enter, be
competitive and profitable, and return to Defense production
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if the need arises. Possible markets may include: foreign
military sales, vaults, high security storage facilities and
vehicles, ships with ice cutting capabilities, and
space/NASA needs. The solution may also involve
incentivizing the contractor to train employees and maintain
special armor tooling requirements. By offering the
contractor sufficient incentives to maintain the critical
process, the Government could recall it when a need arises.
If the technology is unique and cannot be stockpiled or
acquired from other reliable sources, the Government may
have to provide financial incentives for the contractor to
maintain the process.
IMIP is the only DoD or Government program that
is designed to adapt and implement proven process
technology. Another program that focuses on the
preservation of critical processes is Manufacturing
Technologies (ManTech) . [Ref. 58] The ManTech program
assists the contractor in developing enabling technology
projects. IMIP is often used to implement ManTech processes.
Because it is not a proven technology, the technological
risk is significantly higher for a ManTech program than for
IMIP alone. ManTech may also be used to fulfill conversion
strategy at the Service level.
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f. CONCLUSION
Forecasting the effects of a production break is,
at best, a qualitative judgement. Prior to establishing an
IMIP, the product and the elements affected should be
analyzed thoroughly to identify future potential problem
areas. Establishing values for these factors can help
identify performance production situations where learning is
a relevant consideration. As production changes from
multiple units to prototype and limited production, and
current platform production processes are halted, planning
for the production break is increasingly important.
Because of the transformation taking place in
the Defense acquisition environment, many of these measures
may not be initiated by the contractor without Government
intervention. IMIP can supply the contractor with an
effective incentive to implement a production break strategy
that substantially reduces risk and start up costs for
follow-on orders. To be successful, both parties must
benefit by maintaining the surge capability. When a
potential break exists, the contractor with assistance from
the program manager, should develop a comprehensive SMP.
The SMP should be thoroughly reviewed to ensure follow-on
costs will be adequately controlled, and the contractor
sufficiently benefits from the IMIP to justify the program.
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The negotiator's ultimate goal is to bound the
uncertainty involved, by controlling the defined factors
that effect breaks on follow-on orders. Thus performance on
future production will remain efficient. Even though
mobilization may never occur, the capacity to mobilize may
be required in some areas to effectively meet the needs of
an emergency. Prototype production must allow for long
term/multiple production even though only one item is being
produced. Facilities, training and inventories must be
readily available to meet surge requirements.
4. CRITICAL PROCESS VS CRITICAL PRODUCT
In Operation Desert Storm, mobilization time was
extremely short. It currently takes about 15 to 2 years to
field a new weapon system. [Ref. 5] If this indicates the
time frame needed for future manufacturing surge capability,
then there must be a significant reduction in start up time
to utilize shelved technology.
The lengthy production life cycle may make it
difficult for the industrial base to respond quickly to meet
military requirements. It could force the military to
depend on inventory. Inventory levels on many items are
being reduced and a growing number of major weapon systems
and components will be produced in insufficient quantities
to ensure success in a threatening situation. [Ref. 52]
These items are only scheduled for lean or prototype
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production, then the process will be shelved until it is
needed. The success of technology in Operation Desert Storm
shows that the ability to process high-tech systems is even
more important today than in the past. More importantly, it
is an effective deterrent. In fact, it is arguable that the
process is actually more important than the technology
itself.
Wars may be prevented by the threat of weapons under
development or "on the shelf" but wars will be won with
weapons in the field at the time of outbreak. [Ref. 18]
If current trends continue, other countries will eventually
develop these technologies, or technologies which would make
the current ones obsolete, whereas it may take years to
actually be able to utilize these technologies.
Surge capability is primarily relevant for either
long lead time conflict or long duration conflicts.
Operation Desert Storm had a lead time of six months.
Because the conflict was small (relative to other conflicts
e.g. Korea, Vietnam, WWII) and U.S. inventories were large,
surge needs were limited. If a similar conflict arises, the
U.S. may not have adequate inventory to respond. Through
the use of modern and flexible manufacturing processes, time
may be sufficient to move from prototype to large scale
production and field a usable product.
44
With the break up of the Soviet Union, the world
threat, and risk to the U.S. has changed dramatically. The
Government's strategy must include these differences, and
. . .make the most of the Defense dollars saved to benefit
the overall economic and industrial health of our
society, while maintaining a skills base that can be
called upon when necessary in the face of emerging
threats. [Ref. 50:p. 5]
This strategy has to meet the country's military and
economic needs by developing and maintaining reserve
capacity and the ability to apply current commercial
capacity to Defense needs, while preserving and generating
industrial strength and job security. The strategy must also
be integrated into the IMIP determination process.
C. TRANSFERRING SKILLS SURGE/MOBILIZATION
With limited and prototype production processes, the
most valuable benefits to be derived for Defense
manufacturing are reducing both life cycle times and the
effects of production breaks. Meeting surge/mobilization
requires that the U.S. manufacturing industrial base be able
to respond rapidly and effectively to a military crisis
situation by transferring needed skills and facilities to
Defense.
1. FLEXIBILITY
The ability to alternate from one product line to
another can be extremely important. It can also be an
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effective incentive for a contractor to ensure profitability
in dealing with Government contracts. Being able to produce
multiple products allows for easy transition between
products. If one product is in higher demand than the
other, the company can expand in the profitable market.
Rapid reproduction to meet mobilization often
involves expensive materials and equipment. A company
cannot be expected to keep large pieces of machinery and
expensive equipment idle until the DoD places an order. "The
concept of duel use technology should be aggressively
pursued wherever possible." [Ref. 52] Also, the probability
of a threat, the type of threat, and the best way to meet
that threat is constantly changing. This further
substantiates the need for product flexibility. The IMIP
could encourage the contractor to purchase flexible
equipment that can meet multiple needs in both the
commercial and Defense sectors. [Ref 20:p.31] Flexibility
also requires that personnel be trained to make the
transition as effectively as possible. "The importance of
flexibility has not been recognized in past IMIPs." [Ref.
11]
2 . CONSOLIDATION
IMIPs are intended to modernize the production
capability of selected weapon system programs. As the
market becomes smaller, it may become increasingly necessary
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to limit the number of production sources for certain
critical products and coordinate production across Services.
This would allow the remaining sources to achieve
economies of scale and capitalize when necessary. The
threat of foreign competition and the degree of oversight by
the Government would counter monopolist tendencies by the
contractor. It is also vital that the Government utilize
the TQM philosophies; particularly that of cooperation
versus competition. This environment can assist in getting
new technologies into the market faster and ensure the
Government is getting the best product at the best price.
[Ref. 22]
The benefits of maintaining a small supplier base
outweigh those of maintaining a large competitive
environment. [Ref. 52] In the past the Government has
always expressed the importance of competition in Defense
contracting. The more companies competing in a given market,
then the lower the price to the Government. Unfortunately,
highly competitive companies also tend to be less capable of
undergoing capital investment and taking on risk. [Ref. 59]
The larger companies, and those that are threatened by
competition but not overly so (such as in an Oligopoly) are
still incentivized to make manufacturing and technology
improvements. These companies have the ability to take on
47
risks and make capital investments. Through these risks and
investments, they will ultimately produce a product more
beneficial to DoD.
The need for DoD to support industry consolidations is
real and should be pursued where they make sense. ... If
we are going to downsize to the point where we have one
or two producers for a given type of equipment, we must
be certain that we select high quality producers in each
source selection, because losers of any particular
competition may be forced out of business. [Ref. 52]
As an example, if there are currently five American
Defense contractors that produce jet engines, it may not be
in their best interests to conduct an IMIP on each one.
Despite the increase in efficiency, it may be difficult for
all five to stay profitable with small contracts going to
each. These contractors would lose money or require other
Government incentives to stay in business. Whereas, if an
IMIP was conducted on two (or even one) of the facilities,
there would be more contracts for each remaining contractor.
Instead of five companies struggling to stay in the market,
there would be one or two healthy and successful businesses.
Those remaining in the market would have to produce
a larger variety of engines, in smaller numbers. They would
have to keep their operations flexible to keep their profits
high and meet the large variations in DoD needs. The
greater their ability to shift production between products,
the greater the contractor's potential profits. The benefit
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to the Government is that they could consider a larger
number of variations to jet engines in developing a new
weapon system, or modifying a current weapon system.
Maintaining multiple suppliers for similar products
is no longer a viable option for the Industrial base. There
has been increasing pressure on the military to do more
joint purchases and work closer together than in the past.
Many items are similar in design function and process, and
are used by more than one Service. In the past, each
Service purchased these items individually, and from
different suppliers. By combining each Service's purchasing
power centrally, the military can still maintain its
monopsony power and force suppliers to produce efficiently,
and thereby meet conversion objectives.
As the Defense market shrinks, it is also becoming
increasingly cutthroat. Large contractors are struggling to
survive on the remaining business. The problem is further
complicated by many other factors such as uncertainty of
future contracts, policy and regulations, and adversity.
Defense mission continues to vary from year to year and
despite the establishment of long range goals.
Many programs that six months ago were almost
guaranteed funding are now threatened with being cut. The
effects of this uncertainty towards the military, and its
contracts has created a contracting atmosphere that is
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becoming increasingly adversarial and risky. No one wants
to invest in a program (developing manpower equipment) when
the program is in danger.
Also, In the past Defense contractors were some of
the most successful companies in which to invest. Today,
Defense contractors are avoided by investors. Because of
market uncertainty there is major restructuring amongst the
large Defense contractors. [Ref: 3]
If we continue acting without considering the
implications, we may have multiple sources that produce
efficiently but, because of the low scale operations, none
of which would be sufficiently profitable. These contractors
would eventually leave the market. Those that remained
would not have had occasion to modernize. The long term
ramifications may be a few inefficient contractors. "If the
restructuring continues in the Pentagon's current laissez-
faire manner, it could result in the loss of critical design
and manufacturing capabilities." [Ref. 50:p. 2]
We must therefore control the decline in Defense
production by focusing on key technologies, and key
technological suppliers. Some companies have had a highly
successful relationship with the Government in the past
(i.e., consistently providing best product at best price,
responsive and responsible, and providing a professional and
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cooperative effort) . It may be more beneficial to assist
these companies then those that had only a marginally
successful relationship with the Government.
The need to manage the consolidation process to best
achieve overall goals for DoD and the national economy
should be reflected in the IMIP thinking process. Currently
IMIP does not address the major national issues in the
conversion strategy. Also, IMIP is currently run by each
Service, and at the Program Manager level. A centralized
DoD IMIP coordinator does exist. However, IMIP is not
conveying a clear direction on committing the Services to
meeting Government needs. [Ref. 17]
Most program managers do not have the scope or
authority to make IMIP decisions based on commonality.
Government Program Managers are evaluated on the success of
managing a particular phase of a project. It is difficult
to quantify commonality benefits or the conversion success
because they do not show immediate value to the program.
For this reason, a Program Manager may not be inclined to
consider these benefits as important and instead focus on
short range cost benefit type programs.
3 . COMMERCIALIZATION
To the largest extent possible, the DoD should use
commercial products and commercial production facilities to
maintain its industrial base. Commercial production has
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many benefits. There is significant growth in commercial
high technology, which complements DoD Research and
Development efforts. In addition, the commercial market is
significantly more stable and less restricted than the
Defense market is by itself. Finally, commercial market
competition assures the Government buyer that they are
receiving the "Best Product" available. [Ref. 52]
If DoD continues its current procurement policies as
demand decreases, including maintaining sources and
independence across Services, Defense contractors will have
trouble making profits. As a result, DoD may be forced into
Government Owned-Contractor Operated (GOCO) or Government
Owned-Government Operated (GOGO) facilities if it is unable
to stimulate the industrial base to provide necessary goods
and material. It would be more cost effective in the long
run, and in line with the conversion strategy to provide
incentives to stimulate the commercial market and maintain
commercial Defense manufacturing facilities. [Ref. 5]
Noted industrialist Dr. Jacques Gansler stated that "the
problem in integrating civil and military options is not
technology. Rather, it is the unique way in which
Defense business is done." [Ref. 50:p. 4]
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Many changes are currently taking place to
revitalize commercial Defense production that are not IMIP
related: examples include making specifications more
commercially adaptable and buying commercially available
items.
IMIP could also help by successfully justifying the
preservation of the process in a SMP IMIP could also help
the Defense contractor find a commercial market niche, where
it could be successful, and still transfer back to the
Defense market when needed.
4. MULTIYEAR CONTRACTING
The Government needs to consider the long term
implications of its actions. In Prototype and lean
production, provisions are still needed for surge capability
even though no foreseeable threat exists. Multiyear
contracting can significantly reduce mobilization time and
give the contractor the security of future business, and the
ability to plan around the Government's surge requirements.
D. DEVELOPING AND ENCOURAGING NEW PROCESSES
1. IMPROVED PRODUCT
When making process improvements, product
improvements are often discovered. Upgrading the process
may allow for unanticipated product refinement.
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In general, projects that provide quality
improvement will result in improved performance and/or
reduced life cycle costs. [Ref. 14:p. 40] There will be
times when an IMIP improves quality without an associated
cost reduction. These quality improvements are defined and
measured in accordance with the contractor's quality
assurance program. They allow the organization to provide
the Government with a better value.
2. SAFETY/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
In developing Defense products, safety should always
be a concern. In the past, inadequate safety procedures have
proven to be very expensive to the Government.
There usually are benefits to limiting the risk of
future problems associated with hazardous materials. This
includes using less hazardous materials and properly
disposing of hazardous byproducts. There have been many
creative means to dispose of hazardous materials that may
ultimately save the Government money and lower future
liability.
People are becoming increasingly environmentally
conscious and concerned with hazardous materials. Military
suppliers produce large quantities of hazardous materials
and byproducts. By modernizing, a contractor could reduce
any danger associated with the product or process. This
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could substantially decrease future litigation costs. It
could also avoid having to retrieve and redispose something
that was previously disposed of incorrectly.
The military has recently undertaken steps to
improve hazardous materials handling and disposal. The
Government's liability for the contractor's hazardous
material disposal practices is also currently under review.
With regulations becoming more stringent, it may be
beneficial for both the Government and the contractor to
avoid future liability by exceeding current accepted
practices. Through IMIP, waste reduction could be
substantiated as a benefit to avoid future risk of
litigation and damage payments.
3. REDUCED LEAD TIMES
This benefit ties-in very closely with surge
capability. Any reduction in lead time, particularly in
manufacturing, can ultimately improve the DoD's ability to
mobilize in times of crisis.
This factor can be affected most dramatically by
inventories held by the contractor. The Defense contractor
has greater control over production delays, material quality
and cost. It is vital that the Defense contractor have an
effective materials management program and be able to get
needed supplies when necessary.
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4. FUTURE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY
Growth increases the potential to grow. Upgrading a
facility or a process often has collateral effects/benefits.
This factor is based on an emergent strategy. A contractor
hopes that greater market opportunities will arise through
modernizing. [Ref. 33] These changes may allow the company
to enter new markets or make advancements not previously
considered. By not capitalizing, the company becomes
dependent upon the environment to develop new market
opportunities
.
If future potential opportunities were the single
determining reason for modernization, the financial risk
would be very high. Neither the Government nor the
contractor could justify it through an adequate ROI
.
Despite a clear reason for modernizing, many corporations
have been very successful from strategies that emerged after
modernizing.
If the Government is not satisfied with a current
process, but it is the only one currently in existence (a
scenario that may become increasingly common) , modernizing
may allow further advancements not formerly considered.
E. CONCLUSION
Many of these qualitative factors mentioned above are
interrelated and can be quantified (with some difficulty) in
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terms of cost reduction/avoidance. There are many possible
statistical options to develop and measure them. However,
the value attributed to each factor, and the process itself,
would be different for each person conducting the
measurement.
DoD is a large diverse and complex entity. Conversion
will depend on the infrastructure as a whole. It is
impossible for the Government to control every market
aspect, but assistance should be provided in those areas
that are most important (critical technologies) . Preserving
the potential for expanding air ground and maritime forces
will require extraordinary foresight and political courage.
[Ref. 36:p. 41]
Many of these factors cannot be applied directly to an
IMIP, but they all need to be considered in the IMIP
determination process. IMIP should work in concert with
other Government programs; not as a replacement, or
substitute.
When DoD establishes an effective means of weighing
these factors, it is important that it consider all
potential costs and benefits derived from IMIP. Attention
to these factors must begin in the earliest phases of a
program's life cycle and continue through product
development and manufacturing.
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V. IMIP AND THE CONTRACTOR
A. INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Modernization Incentive Program is a
joint venture between military and Defense contractors.
[Ref. 14] Current Defense market conditions have made it
increasingly difficult to make adeguate ROI. [Ref. 3] Also,
major Defense contractors have substantially decreased
capital investment in recent years in reaction to market
changes [Ref. 3]. Solutions developed through IMIP will
become increasingly important in this changing environment.
Productivity partnerships through IMIP will be critical to
delivering reduced guantities of hardware at a more
affordable cost. [Ref. 14:p.5] Since its inception, IMIP
has evolved to meet these needs through streamlined
relationships and rules, reduced emphasis on cost savings,
greater emphasis on implementation, stronger emphasis on
indirect factors, an improved method of reaching the
subcontractor base and heightened management commitment.
[Ref. 14]
IMIP accomplishes its goals by stimulating private
sector capital investment in improved facilities, processes
and systems, while Government and private industry share the
risk and benefits of those improvements. [Ref. 14 :p. 1] The
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types of incentives include; savings based, direct
incentives which are not savings based, incentives based on
market forces, and Government funding. The Government will
also protect the investment" of private companies in high
risk ventures. [Ref. 14]
The type of incentive to be selected is a part of the
early discussions between Government and the interested
contractor. The negotiations are dependent upon the needs of
the sponsoring Government Agency and the strategic
modernization plans of the company seeking the contract.
For IMIP to be effective in the conversion process, it must
be applied to all types of contractors, prime contractors
and subcontractors, and large and small companies.
B. APPLYING IMIP TO SMALL COMPANIES AND SUBCONTRACTORS
The subcontractor base is essential to the continuing
health of the Defense industrial base [Ref. 14:p.7], There
has been a growing concern that the subcontractor base is
shrinking and losing its edge in technology and
productivity. [Ref. 14 :p. 8] IMIP has proven to be one of
the few Government acquisition tools which can effectively
reach all tiers of the subcontractor base. It has been
successfully implemented at the subcontractor level through
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prime contractors such as: General Dynamics, GE Aircraft
Engines, Pratt and Whitney, Northrop, McDonnell-Douglas,
Hughes, and Grumman [Ref. 1]
.
Current statistics show that 90% of the companies that
make up the U.S. industrial base are small companies with
fewer than 150 employees. Typically 65% of weapon system
production is subcontracted, and many times to those small
companies [Ref. 14:p. 4].
In general, most small subcontractors do not have the
staff or the expertise to deal with complex contractual
requirements. Revisions to IMIP have decreased
documentation and reporting requirements and reduced
turnaround in the decision making process. This has improved
and expanded its benefits for the second and third tier
suppliers, making IMIP much more attractive to the small
businesses. [Ref. 14: p. 5]
C. IMIP PROCESS
Contractors can receive IMIP approval by submitting a
qualifying SMP. The SMP represents the company's vision and
identifies specific improvements, long range goals,
objectives and other pertinent information. It also
identifies projects that merit investment. The contractor
SMP must show quantifiable Government benefits from these
investment opportunities, before it will be considered a
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worthy IMIP opportunity. The contractor must provide
sufficient justification for the Government to provide an
incentive. [Ref. 14]
The SMP describes the scope of the facility analysis and
how it will be conducted. It discusses duration of the
study, provides rationale, and shows in detail what
technologies, processes, equipment and facility improvements
will be considered. The proposal also provides insight into
management philosophy and structure, and other pertinent
information. It also specifies how a cost/benefit analysis
will be done. The proposal describes economic analysis and
the cost/savings tracking modeling to be developed or used
to make trade offs between projects. [Ref. 14 :p. 22]
The contractor should address as many of the GROI
factors as possible, as well as anticipated hardship to be
incurred in the process. The Government's intent is to
provide the minimum amount of funding required to
incentivize the contractor to modernize. Inaccuracies in
the SMP may result in one or both of the parties acquiring
extra burden. Significant contract risk can be avoided by
ensuring a accurate and complete SMP is submitted.
Sub-tier contractors usually deal with the prime
contractor. Upon establishing an IMIP program, a prime
contractor manages the program at the subcontractor level on
behalf of the Government. This method is normally chosen
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when subcontractors have one principal prime contractor for
DoD business, or a program office does not have adequate
personnel to commit to a program. The prime contractor
administers the program, establishing a formal program
office to provide management, control, financial incentives
and technology assistance. Many subcontractors are
involved with more than one DoD project. In that case, the
IMIP may be managed by a designated Government program
office. The Government program manager will establish the
guidelines for acceptable IMIP prior to initiating a
program. [Ref. 14]
D. FACTORS OF CONTRACTOR IMIP
Both parties in an IMIP contract seek an adequate return
on their investment. The contractor hopes to achieve an
advantage through IMIP that will ultimately improve its
overall market share, earnings, competitive position or
decrease risk. [Ref. 15] The program allows for both
parties to essentially produce an agreement that will be
mutually beneficial. IMIP benefits to the contractor are
measured based on a Contractor Return On Investment (CROI)
.
CROI is similar to GROI and shares many of the same
benefits.
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Contractor capital investment planning involves a number
of managerial and financial factors. It is justified if the
project can earn a positive net present value. This means
that the project's rate of return must exceed the hurdle
rate. The hurdle rate represents the minimal level of
return required by the company before it will invest in the
project. An effective hurdle rate should consider all types
of factors including those difficult to quantify (e.g., the
value of forgone alternative investments)
.
The reliability of information and extent of the
analysis will determine whether these measurements are
useful. The contractor should consider several factors and
possible incentives prior to entering an IMIP contract with
the Government:
Government Funding This is usually the prime motivator
for the contractor to modernize [Ref. 14:p. 57]. The
Government may offer award fees at various stages in the
IMIP process to include the development of an effective SMP
and factory analysis. The Government may also provide
considerable up front cash investment. For cash poor
contractors and small businesses, this reduces risk and the
financial burden of up front funding. The contractor
determines if capitalization is in its best interests, with
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the costs of the analysis being shared by the Government.
In the commercial market, the contractor would incur the
full burden of the analysis.
Potential Follow-on Contracts Modernization also
increases the potential for follow-on contracts. Once the
Government and contractor have conducted a successful IMIP,
the contractor should be more competitive in the future.
Through multiyear contracting, the Government could also
ensure a long lasting relationship with the contractor. This
relationship could further encourage the contractor to
invest in long term improvements.
Crossover on Commercial Production The company may be
able to use the upgraded facility for non-Government related
projects. Improvements in commercial production could also
improve the company's overall success.
Commercial crossover can be a very complex and difficult
process for a company that has been exclusively a Government
contractor. The commercial market is regulated differently,
and may also require the company to develop marketing and
product distribution skills. IMIP could assist the
contractor in finding markets and developing implementation
strategies.
Sharing of Risk If benefits derived from the program
are uncertain, but the potential for savings is significant,
the Government may be willing to share investment risks.
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This is a key advantage to using the Government as an
investment partner as opposed to another financial
institution.
When modernizing, there is significant financial risk.
Both the contractor and the Government must realize an
adequate financial return in exchange for the level of risk
being assumed. [Ref. 14: p. 37] This may depend on the
potential for future Government contracts (this can be
decreased through multi-year contracting) or the degree to
which modernization is transferable to other markets
(flexibility) . Because the Government shares in the costs
associated with the factory analysis, risk burden during the
determination process is also shared.
Reduction in Costs Modernizing can help the contractor
reduce operating costs. Operations may be streamlined and
more efficient. Also, the Government may assist in
financing up front costs. The Government would then receive
a price reduction for its assistance and the contractor
would benefit through subsequently higher profits.
Productivity Savings Reward (PSR) Assuming that profit
is a contractor's primary long term objective, the project
will be rejected if the contractor estimates that the
investment opportunity will not provide a long term return
on its investment. The contractor's profit is limited on
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Government contracts, so the reduced price would be shared
by both parties. This would result in an improved margin
over a non-IMIP agreement. [Ref. 12]
Increase in Production Capacity and Efficiency
Improving capacity or efficiency may enable the contractor
to improve its present position in the market or enter new
markets. Other benefits may include decreases in
production waste or lower inventories.
Learning Induced Through Upgrading Organizational change
results in learning. The learning may stimulate company
opportunities and offer more directions in which the company
can grow.
Future Investment Opportunities If a major technology
is expected in three years, upgrading the facility now may
hinder, delay or supply unwanted costs to implementing the
new technology in the future. For example, every year
improved personal computers models are available on the
market. Purchasing the newest state-of-the-art system may
require significant capital outlay and in three years the
system may be obsolete. The contractor has to make a
determination whether it is more beneficial to buy now or
wait for the future improved models.
Upgrading now may also be advantageous and improve
investment opportunities by opening more markets. Another
option is a partial modernization. Partially modernizing
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with further improvements pending on the success of these
upgrades allows greater flexibility in the upgrade and
decreases the risk of the investment.
Time Value of Money If the benefits to be derived from
the capitalization are not immediate, the contractor must
consider the time value of the investment and when the
benefits will be derived. All other things being egual, the
longer it takes to get an adeguate ROI, the less beneficial
the investment. Both the Government and the contractor
strive to see immediate benefits from an IMIP.
Increased Market Share The contractor must consider
what effects the facility change will have on the rest of
the market. Capitalization/ Improvements by some companies
can force less efficient companies out of the market,
resulting in greater market control for the contractors
undertaking the improvements. A large market share allows
the company greater autonomy to set industry standards,
perform market sampling, achieve greater economies of scale
and receive higher profits.
Environmental Protection Modernizing to reduce the
amount of hazardous materials used or created may indirectly
benefit the company's future Government and commercial
contract potential. It may also avoid possible litigation
and negative publicity.
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Other Capitalization Investment Alternatives A bank or
other financial institution may be an optional means of
financing. If the contractor has a large interest in the
commercial market, it may be more advantageous to use a
financial institution. Financial institutions do not share
in the savings generated by modernization and tend to have
less stringent requirements than do Government Program
Managers. If all other avenues are exhausted, Government
funding may be the single most important incentive to a
contractor.
Large companies usually have established relationships
with lending institutions and may have financial resources
available for modernization. Small companies may not have
the necessary resources to obtain funds for modernization,
or an established business relationship with a lending
institution.
Disruption From Upgrade The contractor may be hesitant
if the modernization will take a long time and disrupt the
regular work flow. Modernization may stop or slow down
production. It is important to minimize this factor when
developing an SMP.
Administration of IMIP The contractor must also
consider who will administer the program, the level of
oversight, the type and number of reports and the time
involved in answering and processing reports.
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Revisions to the IMIP include provisions reducing the
additional costs and time delays previously associated with
administering IMIP programs. Many of these changes have
only recently been set in motion. Early results seem to
indicate that all parties prefer the new system [Ref.5].
Another consideration is that capitalization
opportunities that ultimately increase the company's
profitability may fail to meet Government requirements. The
contractor should be aware of these requirements so that it
can prepare an SMP that properly forecasts the appropriate
Government benefits through a CBA. All of these factors
need to be discussed, weighed, and agreed upon before
entering into an IMIP program.
E. CONCLUSION
IMIP is a very flexible and useful incentive program for
all types of DoD contractors. It has become easier and more
accessible to them within the past few years. IMIP is not
the only means for companies to capitalize, and is usually
offered only if all other means of modernizing are
exhausted. Before considering IMIP, the company must also
consider the Government's position. The Government is also
looking for a return on its investment. The contractor also
needs to consider other factors such as audit procedures,
procurement policies, Government attitudes, late payments,
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Defense specifications and submission requirements before
entering into any agreement with the Government. Standards
set by the Government may be difficult to achieve, or not
entirely in the companies long term best interests.
IMIP is one of many options to be considered by Defense
contractors. By considering all the factors presented in
this chapter and applying them to the decision making
process, contractors can determine if it is in their own





This chapter will first discuss the conclusions and
recommendations resulting from the research, followed by
answers to the research questions. Finally, recommendations
will be made concerning areas for further research.
B. CONCLUSION
The conclusion is based upon research from extensive
literature review and interviews with industry and
Government experts.
IMIP is underutilized. It is not used for mutually
beneficial modernization projects to the full extent
possible. A critical assumption of the IMIP is that each
savings item has measurable and auditable values. [Ref. 14:
p. 29] Even though the benefits are difficult to quantify,
IMIP could be effectively applied to maintaining critical
processes that would otherwise be lost. This under
utilization is due to:
1. Limited Effectiveness of GROI. There is no clear
means of determining what processes and products are
"critical," and no way for acquisition personnel to make
their own determinations. Considering the concerns of
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Government leaders, IMIP focuses too heavily on reduced
operation and support costs. Its application in the Defense
manufacturing process could be far greater, and much more
valuable, in preserving the industrial base. [Ref 17] In
the past, conversion associated benefits which may have
significantly more value to the country, have been
considered as supplementary to cost savings.
2. Inadequate Funding. IMIP programs are funded
through Government Industrial Base Program Element funds,
Acquisition funds, and funds invested by industry. The IMIP
should focus on centralized Government goals vice project
goals and should therefore have greater accessibility to
centralized Government funds. Other than funds invested by
industry, current funding support is uncertain and
diminishing. [Ref. 17]
3. Mixed Guidance. With mixed guidance for IMIP from
the leadership of the military Services, it is difficult to
establish the budgetary and organizational infrastructure
necessary to sustain the program.
Since there is no clear chain of program advocacy, many
divergent levels of direction, along with diffused and




By implementing the following recommendations IMIP will
be more usable and effectively meet the conversion needs:
1. Jointness. Combined purchasing can enhance DoD
monopsony power. All Services are seeing a significant
reduction in buying power. Jointness allows for a strong
single face to the contractor and greater buying power.
2. Recognition/Reward. Recognize the PM for giving
conversion modernization incentives to contractors. The PM
should always act in the Government's best interests, which
may not necessarily be in the program's best interests.
3. Clear guidance. Government acquisition needs must be
clarified. A strict definition of critical technologies and
a means of rating their importance is vital to maintaining a
U.S. Defense industrial capability.
4. Consistent level support. The Government needs to be
both flexible and consistent in adapting to military needs.
[Ref. 17: p. 9]
5. Education of personnel. IMIP needs wider
recognition in industry and DoD. People need to be made
aware of the various options available to them in developing
and maintaining an effective Government contract
relationship. Acquisition personnel also need to be
informed of how to effectively use IMIP.
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6. Complete Endorsement. Support for the program must
be completely integrated within the Service. For IMIP to be
successful, it also needs to have the complete support of
Congress, OSD, DLA, and all the Services.
...Limited manpower resources are frequently reflected
in the contracts area where IMIP is relegated to second
class status. This leads to long delays and often
tedious negotiations. [Ref. 17]
7. GROI. Conversion factors need to be more important
in the decision process. Potential facilities upgrades
should be weighed as to their total Government benefit.
Extend life cycle costing to include the conversion
benefits.
8. Sufficient Funding. Centrally located funding is
needed in sufficient quantity to effectively meet
conversion.
9. Ratify The Proposed Revisions to IMIP. Recommended
changes by the AIA and the IMIP guide committee should be
integrated as soon as possible into the newly proposed
guide. These changes address many of the researcher's
recommendations as well as decrease program complexity.
This would make it more usable to all types of contractors.
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D. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary Research Question: As the Defense acquisition
environment changes, can IMIP effectively incentivize
Defense contractors to make capital investments to improve
their operations and benefit the military?
IMIP is a very flexible program that has an unlimited
variety of applications in the future acquisition
environment. To maximize its usefulness to the Government,
IMIP must evolve to further recognize Governmental needs.
This new direction should focus heavily on risk
reduction/qualitative improvements such as flexibility and
surge and mobilization needs. By implementing this Thesis*
recommendations, IMIP can effectively maintain critical
processes that would otherwise be lost.
Subsidiary Research Questions:
1. What are IMIP's goals and objectives?
IMIP was developed to encourage contractor financed
investments to refine production efficiency, reduce cost,
improve quality and increase reliability. It is a joint
venture between Government and industry to reduce
acquisition costs, accelerate the development of modern
equipment and management techniques, and broaden the
industrial base. The Nation's economic condition,
international competition, rising acquisition costs and the
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potential for technological improvements made it of
paramount importance to improve acquisition efficiency in
the 1980s and 1990s.
2. What are the Government's and DoD's goals and
objectives with respect to Defense procurement?
1. Developing quality management programs-Defense
firms and the Defense Department must foster a
commitment of increasing productivity and promoting
a world class industrial base.
2. Transferring skills-Successful Defense conversion
requires not only transferring skills and facilities
away from Defense, but being able to transfer them
back to Defense when necessary.
3. Promoting technical education-Educational
programs in engineering, especially in the areas of




Encouraging new manufacturing techniques-The
United States must not only maintain its weapons
superiority, it must seek ways of increasing its
national competitiveness.
5 Preserving elements of the Defense industrial
base-Unique Defense systems critical to national
security should be retained. as an example, heavy
industries, especially ships submarines, are of
particular concern.
6. Changing acquisition policies-Regulatory barriers
to commercial/Defense integration should be
eliminated, thus maximizing the use of commercially
available components and production facilities.
[Ref. 50:p. 5]
>
3. Are all benefits, including those that are difficult
to quantify, assessed according to their military value when
measuring GROI?
No, Government leaders are putting far greater emphasis
on conversion factors, and less on cost improvements than is
presently reflected in IMIP's
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4. Are IMIP successes rated on these benefits?
No, IMIP successes are based on reduced operation and
support costs. Its application in the Defense manufacturing
process could be far greater and much more valuable to
preserving the industrial base. GROI needs to be
restructured to properly weigh each factor. The other
factors to be considered are extremely difficult to quantify
in terms of Cost savings and cost avoidance. Greater focus
should be placed on other benefits such as flexibility, and
surge capability.
5. Can IMIP reduce the decline of manufacturing
capability in the Defense industrial base?
Yes, it is important that when DoD establishes an
effective means of weighing these factors, that it considers
all potential costs and benefits derived from IMIP.
Attention to these factors must begin in the earliest phases
of a program's life cycle and continue through product
development and manufacturing.
6. What IMIP changes can further its benefits to the
Defense industrial base and the Government?
While developing a Strategic Modernization Plan (SMP)
,
all factors need to be considered. IMIP is by no means a
save-all for every DoD program but it has the capacity to be
utilized far greater then present. This should be done to
meet the full intent for which IMIP was designed.
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The IMIP's flexibility allows for an infinite number of
applications. An area where IMIP could make significant
benefits would be in limiting the effects of production
breaks. By implementing the Thesis recommendations, IMIP's
usefulness to the Government could expand significantly.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Develop a model by which a Service could effectively
weigh and apply GROI factors to limit the effects of
breaks in production in a lean or prototype
acquisition. Producing a small number of products
is lean production. Producing one of a particular
weapon system is prototype production.
2. IMIP funds are available for facility analysis,
design, and integration of technologies.
Determining whether IMIP should incentivize the
contractor to commercialize, develop dual uses for
their production processes, assist the contractors




Determining whether IMIP should be expanded to
assist in modernizing GOGO, GOCO facilities.
4 Develop a model to preserve current platform support
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